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Machines and the Moral Community 
Erica L. Neely 
 
Abstract:  A key distinction in ethics is between members and non-members of the moral community.  Over time, 
our notion of this community has expanded as we have moved from a rationality  criterion to a sentience criterion 
for membership.  I argue that a sentience criterion is insufficient to accommodate all members of the moral 
community; the true underlying criterion can be understood in terms of whether a being has interests.  This may be 
extended to conscious, self-aware machines, as well as to any autonomous intelligent machines.  Such machines 
exhibit an ability to formulate desires for the course of their own existence; this gives them basic moral standing.  
While not all machines display autonomy, those which do must be treated as moral patients; to ignore their claims to 
moral recognition is to repeat past errors.  I thus urge moral generosity with respect to the ethical claims of 
intelligent machines. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A key distinction in ethics is between members and non-members of the moral community; this 
is the foundation for understanding how we should treat the entities we encounter in the world.  
Over time our notion of this community has expanded; those we take as non-members have 
changed, and the criteria used to make that distinction have also altered.  Historically, as 
surveyed by Lorraine Code (1991), Charles Mills (1999) and Naomi Zack (2002), criteria such as 
intellect and rationality were used to separate white men from women and non-whites.  Taken to 
be governed primarily by emotion rather than rationality, these people were seen as moral 
inferiors, deserving of lesser or no moral consideration. 
Even upon conceding that rationality was not the exclusive preserve of white men, and so 
including women and non-whites as members of the moral community, many continue to deny 
moral standing to animals.  Both contemporary thinkers (Scruton 2006) and earlier philosophers 
(Kant 1786/1996) see humans as having the moral high ground of rationality and consciousness.  
However, rationality criteria raise questions as to how rational a being must be to receive moral 
standing – there is a serious risk of excluding certain humans (such as infants) from the moral 
community which, as discussed by Peter Singer (2002), is unpalatable to many thinkers.  
Furthermore, our understanding of the biological similarities between humans and other animals 
makes it difficult to maintain a sharp distinction between them; various other animals seem to 
possess degrees of rationality and consciousness as well.
1
  Such reasoning has caused many 
(Bentham 1823/1996; Taylor 1996; Singer 2002) to move to sentience as the criterion for moral 
standing: if something can feel pain, it is wrong to take intentional action to make it suffer 
unnecessarily.
2
   
This is a large expansion to the moral community, yet of course many things continue to lack 
moral standing; an object such as a table or chair is not a member of the moral community, for 
instance, because it is not possible to cause moral harm to the object itself.  Unless the object 
belongs to someone else, I can do what I wish to it; the only kind of moral harm that can be 
                                                 
1
 For instance, the National Institute of Health (2013) has recently designated chimpanzees as inappropriate for most 
forms of animal research, since they are our closest relatives and “are capable of exhibiting a wide range of 
emotions; expressing personality; and demonstrating individual needs, desires, and preferences.”  The sort of clear 
distinction between human and non-human animals once thought to exist is increasingly being challenged, giving 
rise to new ethical implications. 
2
 Obviously there is clarification required to specify what constitutes unnecessary suffering and exactly how much 
moral standing animals have.  However, sentience suffices to give them a foot in the door of the moral community, 
so to speak. 
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caused in this situation is harm to a person or persons who have a claim to that object.
3
  As such, 
there is currently a strong ethical divide between living beings and non-living things.  This has 
serious implications for the ethical issues pertaining to intelligent machines, since they too are 
inanimate objects.  There is a strong temptation to classify them as similarly undeserving of any 
moral standing.   
I will argue that the relevant criterion for membership in the moral community should not be 
understood as whether one can feel pain but rather whether something has interests.  While 
sentience is certainly one way of having interests, it is not the only one.  Using this criterion, I 
will show that certain kinds of machines are, in fact, members of the moral community; 
specifically, I will argue that they are moral patients.
4
  Thus while we are correct in extending 
membership in the moral community to encompass humans and animals, we must further extend 
it further to include these machines. 
 
2. Ethics and the Prevention of Harm 
 
When conversing with people, one informal objection that frequently occurs to granting moral 
standing to a machine is the claim that you cannot “hurt” a machine.  In essence, this is an 
internalization (and over-simplification) of the sentience criterion for moral standing.  Ethics is 
often taken to involve the prevention of harm; as David Gunkel (2012) notes, the central question 
of moral patiency often is phrased as whether something can suffer.  Hence if something cannot 
be harmed, many are reluctant to offer moral standing to the thing in question.   
For humans, the harm generally involves some kind of pain.  However, the ability to feel 
physical pain cannot be the only criterion for membership in the moral community.  Consider a 
person with congenital analgesia, i.e., one who is unable to register physical pain.  If someone 
were to step on his foot, he would not be able to feel any pain from the action.  Yet it would 
surely be wrong if one stepped on him simply because one took a kind of perverse amusement in 
his inability to feel it.  Stepping on his foot intentionally, without his permission, and without 
some kind of greater justification strikes us as wrong.
5
  
This is not because the action caused pain (since, by design, it does not); sentience as 
construed to involve purely physical sensations is not sufficient to render this action wrong.  
Furthermore, even if we extend sentience to include mental or emotional pain, it is still 
insufficient; it is wrong to cause harm even if the victim is emotionally unmoved, such as when 
we see emotional dissociation in child soldiers or victims of abuse.  The wrongness in our case 
stems from two key points.  First, the action could cause damage, even if it does not cause pain.  
Second, since we have specified that the person does not give permission for the action, 
deliberately stepping on his foot violates his desire to remain unmolested; moreover, there is 
little justification for this violation. 
                                                 
3
 The ownership of an object could be the community as a whole, such as with public art installations.  If someone 
were to destroy the Vietnam Veteran’s Memorial, one could argue that it would cause harm to the public (which has 
a claim on the memorial) and is thus morally wrong.  It would be odd to say that you had morally wronged the 
monument itself, however. 
4
 I am concerned in this paper with what it takes for a machine to be deserving of rights and hence be a moral 
patient.  I leave open the question of what it would take for a machine to have moral responsibilities and thus be a 
moral agent. 
5
 This action might be justified if it were done out of a different motivation.  Even if I lack his consent, deliberately 
stepping on his foot might be acceptable if it prevented a greater harm (such as stepping into the path of a vehicle.)  
However, this is a rather different case than interfering with another’s body simply because it entertains me. 
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What is necessary for moral standing is not sentience per se but having interests; the person in 
our congenital analgesia example lacks sensation, but he retains interests.  As it is possible to 
harm those interests, it is possible to harm him.  To expand, consider John Basl’s definition of 
interests as “those things the satisfaction of which contributes to [an individual’s] welfare.” (Basl 
2012)  This implies that a being can have interests without being aware of them.  For instance, an 
ant may have an interest in not being stepped on and killed even if the ant is unaware of that 
interest; similarly for a person in a persistent vegetative state.
6
  In each case, their welfare can be 
threatened regardless of whether they are aware of that threat.  Of course, many times we are 
aware of our interests – we have ideas about how we wish to run our lives, and thus have some 
interest in those plans being followed; we may be harmed if our desires are simply ignored.   
The notion of harm that is relevant for morality, therefore, moves beyond physical pain and 
hinges on the idea of disrespecting the integrity and autonomy of the individual. The possibility 
of the action causing damage, even if it does not cause pain, raises the idea of bodily integrity.  
At a minimum, beings have an interest in retaining sufficient bodily integrity for continued 
existence; anything which damages one’s body threatens this interest.  This interest can certainly 
be outweighed by other factors – I may consent to having my appendix removed because that 
particular violation of bodily integrity actually promotes my continuation under certain 
circumstances.  Frequently in medicine we consent to actions which are extremely damaging to 
our bodies (such as chemotherapy) if the alternatives are worse.
7
 
In addition to these dramatic cases, we consent to small violations of bodily integrity on a 
regular basis; it is clearly possible to overstate our commitment to it, since most people trim their 
fingernails or their hair or will pick open the occasional scab.  Yet people are unlikely to see 
those actions as presenting any serious threat to continued existence.  Hence one might argue that 
a minor harm, such as stepping on a person’s foot, cannot truly be objected to on this basis alone.  
Indeed, I believe that the emphasis on bodily integrity dovetails with the desire to remain 
unmolested mentioned above; together they highlight the fact that we have certain wishes about 
the shapes of our lives. 
By ignoring the person’s desire not to be trod upon, the aggressor’s action violates his 
autonomy.  In much of ethics, autonomy is emphasized as an important good.
8
  To cast it aside 
for no reason other than to satisfy one’s own sadistic desires is to jeopardize the interest of the 
injured person in governing the course of his own life.  Such an action may not cause physical 
pain, but it clearly causes harm to that person – it treats him as incapable or unworthy of 
directing his own actions, and views his desires as irrelevant and something that may simply be 
                                                 
6
 This is why it would, for instance, be wrong to take pornographic photos of a person in a persistent vegetative 
state; we believe that a person can be harmed even if he or she is unaware of it. 
7
 One could also justify suicide this way for some cases, since my interest in bodily integrity could be outweighed by 
an interest in avoiding large amounts of suffering from a terminal disease, say.  While we have an interest in bodily 
integrity, it is not the only interest that matters. 
8
 We see this both in Kant (1786/1996) with the view of rational beings as ends-in-themselves and in Mill 
(1859/1993) with the emphasis on individual liberty. 
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ignored.
9
  Although it is clear that sometimes a person’s desires must, ethically, be overridden, 
we surely cannot ignore another’s wishes completely. 10   
Hence while sentience certainly leads to having interests, it is not necessary for them: the joint 
properties of consciousness and self-awareness will also suffice.
11
  Once a being is self-aware 
and conscious, it is aware of its self, can desire continuation of that self, and can formulate ideas 
about how to live its life.
12
  It is possible to harm such a being by ignoring or thwarting those 
desires; one should not act against the being’s wishes, therefore, without some overriding reason.  
The requirement of such a reason, however, is equivalent to granting the being at least minimal 
moral standing; one does not need to have a reason to destroy a chair, but one must provide such 
a reason to destroy a human.  This holds true for intelligent machines just as much as for a 
person with congenital analgesia; they both have interests and desires, hence they both have 
basic moral standing.  
One could object at this point that we have moved too quickly from consciousness to ascribing 
desires to a machine.  Basl discusses the possibility of a machine which is conscious only insofar 
as it has the ability to experience colours.  However, it has no emotional or cognitive responses 
to those experiences – it may experience blue, but it does not care.  Basl claims that it would not 
be wronging such a machine if we were to shut it down.  Similarly, suppose a being existed 
which could feel pain but had no aversive reaction towards it; furthermore, this is the only 
conscious experience the being has.  In this case, the being would presumably have no interest in 
avoiding pain, and Basl believes that it would not be wrong to cause pain to it.  In each of these 
cases, Basl argues, there is consciousness without moral patiency.  Consciousness, understood as 
the ability to have sensory experiences, is not sufficient for having interests – instead one must 
have the capacity for attitudes towards those experiences. (Basl 2012) 
Basl’s view of consciousness is extremely limited, however.  Steve Torrance (2012) notes that 
“To think of a creature as having conscious experience is to think of it as capable of experiencing 
things in either a positively or negatively valenced way – to think of it as having desires, needs, 
goals, and states of satisfaction and dissatisfaction or suffering.”  I believe that this robust notion 
of conscious experience is more in line with what we mean when we consider conscious 
machines.  Basl is correct in arguing that the liminal cases he describes are likely not instances of 
moral patiency.  Furthermore, there is importance to considering these instances, since it seems 
probable that the first conscious machines will be more akin to the machine which can 
experience colour than any others.  However, the first machines we recognize as conscious will 
likely be ones which exhibit consciousness of the sort Torrance describes, and these machines 
                                                 
9
 While I will not rehearse the arguments for each ethical theory in detail, note that ignoring a person’s desires for 
his life will fail to calculate the utility/disutility generated by particular actions, will treat the person as a means to an 
end, is certainly not something rational people are likely to consent to from behind a veil of ignorance, and 
demonstrates a lack of care, compassion, and benevolence.  None of these ethical theories will condone simply 
ignoring the desires of a person, although they will almost certainly allow us to take actions counter to those desires 
in many cases. 
10
 This is one reason why advance directives are important, even if fraught with complications: they allow a person 
to express her wishes in advance to cover circumstances (such as being in a coma) where she cannot do so directly.   
11
 An interesting discussion of the connection between self-awareness and moral standing (or personhood, as she 
puts it) can be found in Mary Anne Warren’s discussion of personhood and abortion (Warren 1973)  as well as in 
Scruton (2006). 
12
 It might be that consciousness is also unnecessary for having interests, particularly if we consider an Objective-
List view of welfare, as Basl (2012), notes.  Hence the category of moral patients may extend slightly further than I 
argue for here; any machine with interests will count, although I am only arguing here that conscious and self-aware 
machines have interests. 
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clearly would have the necessary propositional attitudes in order to have interests.
13
 As such, my 
previous argument stands, and such machines would have moral patiency.
14
  
 
3. Intelligence and Autonomy 
 
Thus far I have argued that having interests is what is necessary for moral standing.  Since 
conscious, self-aware machines have interests, they also are moral patients.  In general, however, 
the question of moral standing for machines is raised in the context of artificial intelligence – 
would an intelligent machine have moral standing?  To provide an answer to this general 
question, we must ask whether we can assume that intelligent machines are conscious and self-
aware.  If so, we have addressed the moral standing of all intelligent machines; if not, then 
further work is necessary to clarify the status of the remaining machines. 
To respond to this, we must consider what is meant by an intelligent machine.  Shane Legg 
and Marcus Hutter have gathered many of our informal definitions of intelligence and used them 
to devise a working account of machine intelligence.  (Legg and Hutter 2006a, 2006b, 2007)  
Informally, their definition of intelligence is “Intelligence measures an agent’s ability to achieve 
goals in a wide range of environments.”15 (Legg and Hutter 2007) One key question that emerges 
from this definition is who determines the goals of the agent.  There are two possibilities: one, 
the agent’s goals are always determined by an outside source or, two, the agent’s goals are not 
always determined by an outside source. 
Consider the case where the agent’s goals are always established by an outside source.  In this 
case, the goals are communicated to the agent in some fashion, and the agent simply uses its 
resources to accomplish whatever goals it has been given.  For instance, my computer takes 
actions based on user input and the commands dictated by its programming; its actions are 
always ultimately determined by a human.  Such an agent lacks autonomy.
16
  Since the agent 
lacks self-awareness and lacks the ability to formulate goals for itself, the argument for moral 
standing does not apply; it will not have a desire for continuation or any wishes as to how to live 
its life.  As such, it is in the same category with chairs and tables mentioned above and lacks 
moral standing; it is not clear how one could harm or benefit such an entity.
17
 
                                                 
13
 I believe that we are more likely to recognize as conscious a machine which has a robust consciousness since that 
consciousness is more like our own and thus more apt to display behaviors which match up with the conscious 
behaviors of humans.  It is far from clear how we would ever determine that  machine had an awareness of colors if 
that were the full extent of its consciousness.  Hence while we may create such limited machines, I suspect we will 
not realize we have done so. 
14
 Marie-des-Neiges Ruffo (2012) would likely object to this conclusion as she believes that machines are not things 
which are capable of well-being or ill-being because they lack human feelings.  I find this unconvincing for two 
reasons.  First, I believe you could create a case which paralleled  the congenital analgesia example and argue that it 
is still wrong to harm such a person even if she lacked emotion.  Second, it is not clear to me why she assumes that 
we will never be able to create machines which have emotions.  It is true that we cannot currently do so, but there 
was a time when everyone was certain a machine would never be able to play chess.  This has, of course, proven 
false; as such, I find our current capabilities to be poor predictors of future ability. 
15
 They provide a formal definition (Legg and Hutter 2007), however space does not permit the detailed exposition 
required to fully explicate this definition. 
16
 I am using “autonomy” in the sense typical of ethics, meaning something akin to “being able to make one’s 
decisions free of external influence or control;” the term is (confusingly) used somewhat differently at times in 
robotics.   
17
 Presumably the machine is not sentient, or we could have had a much shorter argument for moral standing; as 
such, it cannot gain moral rights through an appeal to sentience.  One might try to argue that such a being has 
rationality and thus, on some views of morality at least, must be granted moral standing.  I am not convinced this is 
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Contrariwise, consider the case where the agent’s goals are not always determined by an 
outside source, i.e., where the agent is capable of determining its own goals at least some of the 
time
18
.  In this case, the agent is expressing a basic capacity for autonomy, which implies that 
these goals must be chosen by the agent itself; they cannot simply be chosen by following an 
algorithm or program.
19
  As such, the agent must be deciding for itself what it desires to do.  
Once an agent is capable of exhibiting desires, however, we may collapse this into my previous 
argument concerning moral standing; while the agent’s desires may be overridden, they may not 
simply be ignored.
20
     
One could object that this argument is prejudiced by the use of the word “desires” – perhaps 
the machine is choosing what to do, one might argue, but that does not imply that the machine 
desires that course of action.  Yet, it is not at all clear what such a choice would mean, in this 
case, since it cannot be determined by an algorithm or program.  The machine would need to be 
making a decision which was in some sense its own; it could not be purely the result of an 
outside influence or program.  Where else would the choice stem from if not from the machine’s 
own wishes?  If we have eliminated any external factors or internal compulsion, what remains is 
the machine’s own will.21   
One point worth noting is that moral questions are not black-and white; both autonomy and 
moral standing exist on a continuum.
22
  The more autonomous the machine, the more duty we 
will have to respect its wishes; the less autonomy, the more we are permitted to act as its 
guardian.   This is akin to how we treat children and the severely mentally disabled; they are not 
viewed as capable of making decisions in as many areas as fully-functioning adults, hence we do 
not see their desires as binding to the same extent.  They still have moral standing, of course, in 
that it is wrong to harm them without just cause.  Nevertheless, they are not granted as much 
governance over the course of their own lives, and we do not view overriding their wishes as 
comparable to overriding the wishes of other adults.  In a similar fashion, a machine with greater 
                                                                                                                                                             
the case; while Kant sees morality as shared by rational beings, he makes it clear that the kinds of beings he is 
discussing have a will – the machines, as I have described them, do not.  (Kant 1786/1996) In general, I believe that 
the rationality criterion for moral standing is more complex than simple intelligence, and machines with bare 
intelligence will likely not satisfy it. 
18
 It is not clear whether such a machine currently exists; I suspect it does not yet, although the evolution of drone 
technology seems to be heading us in this direction. 
19
 While the choices may be influenced by the programming of the machine, human choices are also influenced by 
upbringing, societal pressure, brain chemistry, and so forth.  Since moral theorizing generally views human 
autonomy as worth preserving despite these factors, machine autonomy likewise has worth. 
20
 One might also make the argument that autonomy itself is sufficient for granting something moral standing.  If we 
view autonomy as a good, then the fact that such machines exhibit autonomy suffices to grant them at least some 
consideration.  We may place limits on the expression of their autonomy, just as we do for people, but we likely 
could not simply ignore it. 
21
 Note that this argument is separate from the argument of whether such machines could exist.  Ruffo (2012) 
believes that a machine cannot deliberate; any choice it makes would be a result of programming.  As such, she 
would argue that no machine could determine its own goals.  While I am unconvinced, it is not necessary for our 
present purposes. 
22
 A machine which is programmed to learn based on past interactions will be somewhere along this continuum, 
depending on the complexity of its programming; a simple program will likely result in a machine with little 
autonomy, but a complex program may approach the situation we have with humans.  Since we also learn and adapt 
as a result of our interactions – following social norms, rules we have been taught, biological imperatives, and so 
forth –  a sufficiently complex set of instructions for a machine may model this; if we consider ourselves to be at 
least somewhat autonomous, we must consider the machine to be as well. 
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autonomy likely has more claim on us to respect that autonomy, and it will be a greater moral 
fault if we ignore its wishes.
23
 
In summary, I believe that autonomy implies that the agent has desires.  My previous argument 
fails to apply only to intelligent machines which both lack self-awareness and consciousness and 
also which are not capable of setting their own goals.  Such machines lack moral standing 
because they have no self-concept and no desires; it is implausible to hold that they could desire 
existence or have goals for that existence.  Determining whether and to what extent a machine is 
autonomous will likely be difficult, however, and those who oppose granting moral standing to 
machines might well use this as an excuse to deny their moral worth.  This is a dangerous move 
to make, though, since the long-standing philosophical dilemma of other minds demonstrates that 
it is also hard to ensure that other people have minds and are not cleverly programmed automata 
which simply deceive us into thinking they are conscious humans.  
The problem of how to determine whether machines are conscious or autonomous is difficult.  
Torrance (2012) seems fairly optimistic about the prospect; assuming that consciousness is not 
simply some mysterious fact about the universe, then it likely hinges on facts about the structure 
of our brains and is exhibited in our behaviour.  Hence, in general, we assume that a person is 
conscious because she acts in particular ways and because she has certain biological similarities 
to ourselves; if we take ourselves to be conscious, then a creature which acts like us and is built 
like us seems likely to be as well.  Yet, as Basl points out, this is challenging to extend to 
machines because they are not like us biologically.  Even if we build machines with biological 
components, they will not share the same evolutionary history as we do; hence it is more difficult 
to argue that their minds have developed similarly (and thus must also have given rise to 
consciousness.)  (Basl 2012) Perhaps as our knowledge of what is physically necessary for 
consciousness in humans progresses will be able to recreate it in an artificial setting; for now, it 
leaves us in a bit of a quandary.
24
 
In general, it is wise to err on the side of caution – if something acts sufficiently like me in a 
wide range of situations, then I should extend moral standing to it.
25
  Joanna Bryson (2010) has 
argued that there is danger in being overly generous and extending rights to machines because 
we may waste energy and resources on entities which are undeserving of them; furthermore, this 
diverts our attention from the human problems which should be our concern.
26
  However, I 
believe she is too hasty in arguing that we simply can avoid the problem by not designing robots 
which deserve moral concern.  While she is correct that we design and build robots, it should be 
clear to anyone who interacts with computers or software that we do not always correctly predict 
                                                 
23
 The analogy is somewhat imperfect, since we tend to take children to be beings who will increase in autonomy 
over time; they have the potential for as much autonomy as fully-functioning adults, whereas we generally are not as 
optimistic about the prospects of the severely mentally disabled.  However, I can see the potential for both sorts of 
machines: there may be some whose autonomy only ever reaches a low level and others whose autonomy develops 
over time.  Hence the two prongs of this analogy are both useful, since I believe our treatment of those machines 
ought to parallel our treatment of similar humans. 
24
 For that matter, we could likely repeat this argument when addressing the question of whether a machine can have 
a mind, since again such a machine will not share our evolutionary history and so forth. 
25
 Think of this as the moral equivalent of the Turing Test: if the machine’s behaviour is indistinguishable from a 
human’s behaviour in most situations, then there is a prima facie case for treating it similarly.  This argument is used 
by Peter Singer (2002) to argue for our assumptions of sentience both in other people and in animals.  A similar line 
of thought has been developed by Rob Sparrow (2004, 2012) in trying to determine when we would view a machine 
as similar enough to a human to warrant the same moral standing. 
26
 This concern has been echoed by Torrance (2012), although he seems more sympathetic to the dangers of 
mistakenly denying rights to machines which deserve them.  
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the results of our creations; moreover, there will almost certainly be someone who tries to design 
a self-aware autonomous machine simply because he can – because it would be interesting.27  As 
such, it is overly optimistic to believe we can simply avoid the question in the manner she 
suggests.   
Once we acknowledge that someone is likely to try to create such machines, or perhaps has 
even done so, we cannot ignore the question of appropriate moral standing.  At least two 
pertinent objections must be acknowledged.  First, there is the concern that by extending moral 
standing too widely with respect to machines we might unjustly limit the rights of the creators or 
purported owners of said machines: if, in fact, those machines are not autonomous or self-aware, 
then we have denied the property claims of their owners.  Second, there is Bryson’s concern that 
we may waste resources by extending rights to machines that are not autonomous.  In each of 
these cases, however, I see the moral fault in being overly conservative is much larger than the 
risk of being overly generous.   
The risk of losing a piece of property is trivial compared to denying moral standing to a being.  
However, it is much more difficult to dismiss the larger concern that, as a society, we may divert 
resources inappropriately; we have difficulty using our resources to aid the humans we know 
have moral standing, and the problem only magnifies when we consider the case of machines.  It 
is certainly reasonable to recognize that our resources are limited and we may not be able to help 
all persons.  Yet surely it is morally repugnant to allow someone to freeze to death because we 
had diverted our energy to power my toaster.  While we may must sometimes make difficult 
choices in situations where we cannot help all people, even those who are ultimately unaided 
must be given ethical consideration; we cannot simply ignore them.
28
  Yet, of course, there is 
great uncertainty in determining whether machines are moral persons; how then should we 
address the worry of diverting resources inappropriately? 
I believe the best approach is a probabilistic one.  We generally believe that other humans are 
sufficiently like us in various respects that we see as relevant to having moral status.  While the 
problem of other minds raises the possibility that we are deceived, most of us regard it as 
relatively unlikely; we view the probability of error as too small to risk denying moral standing 
based on that possibility.  While we cannot directly know what it is like to be another human, we 
use our best understanding to draw parallels with our own experiences; we then make decisions 
based on that understanding.   
We do the same thing when considering the moral status of non-human animals, albeit with a 
higher probability of error.  Hence we may examine the behaviours of chimpanzees, the brain 
activity in various animals, and so forth.  We then compare this to our criteria for moral standing 
and ask how likely the entity is to satisfy those criteria; if an animal whimpers when you step on 
its paw, what is the probability that its whimper is a sign of pain?  If an animal appears to exhibit 
emotions, does that make it psychologically like us?  We assign moral statuses depending on our 
answers to these questions, and we reassign statuses when new data shows us that our previous 
beliefs were mistaken; this is why we have moved away from using chimpanzees in medical 
research, for instance.  (National Institute of Health 2013) 
                                                 
27
 There are already many researchers involved in trying to create intelligent machines, for instance via The Mind 
Machine Project at MIT.  Furthermore, there has been a great deal of discussion about what consciousness or self-
awareness in a machine would entail.  For a number of optimistic outlooks on the matter see Long and Kelley 
(2010), O’Regan (2012), Gorbenko et al. (2012). 
28
 This is why presumably no matter what decision one makes in the trolley case, one is acting unethically if she 
fails to consider the humanity of all of the people involves.  Simply ignoring the personhood of any of the 
individuals involved is not an ethical move, no matter how much simpler it would make the scenario. 
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Our application of moral criteria to beings other than ourselves always rests on a kind of 
estimation because it is not possible to have first-hand experience of others’ situations.  In the 
case of non-human animals, as well as in the case of other humans, we are able to find biological 
similarities to ourselves.  However, we will clearly have some evidence in the machine case as 
well: the question will then be how likely we believe that its behaviours stem from consciousness 
and self-awareness as opposed to mere programming.  Whether we acknowledge it as a moral 
patient will depend on our answer; if it seems highly likely, then we are more apt to divert 
resources to it.  If it seems less likely, then we may only divert those resources if they are not 
needed for others.  
We will undoubtedly be mistaken in our estimates at times.  A failure to acknowledge the 
moral standing of machines does not imply that they actually lack moral standing; we are simply 
being unjust in such cases, as we have frequently been before.  I am inclined to be generous 
about moral standing, however, because history suggests that humans naturally tend to 
underestimate the moral status of those who are different.  We have seen women and children 
treated as property; even today many victims of human trafficking are still treated this way. 
Under the auspices of colonialism, entire existing civilizations of people of colour were 
dismissed as inferior to those of white Europeans.  Animals remain a source of contention, 
despite the fact that they seem to suffer.  I believe that we are already very sceptical about the 
status of others; as such, I am less worried that we will be overly generous to machines and more 
worried that we will completely ignore their standing.  I see the risk of diverting resources 
inappropriately away from machines as far less likely than the risk of enslaving moral persons 
simply because they are physically unlike us.
29
  
 
4. Moral Standing and Rights  
 
4.1 Rights of Machines 
  
The moral standing of intelligent autonomous machines is a natural extension of the sentience-
based criteria for moral standing.
30
  Intelligent, self-aware machines are beings which have 
interests and therefore have the capacity to be harmed.  Hence, they have at a minimum moral 
claims to self-preservation and autonomy, subject to the usual limits necessary to guarantee the 
rights of other community members. 
It is difficult to specify what moral entitlements said machines will have until we know the 
nature of those machines.  For instance, Kevin Warwick (2012) discusses the possibility of 
conscious robots with biological brains.  If those brains contain a sufficient number of human 
neurons, then they deserve the same kinds of protections we give to other beings with such 
neural complexity; we would be committing a moral wrong if we treated them as simply a thing 
in a laboratory.  However, since machines (whether a biological hybrid or not) are physically 
rather different than humans, some rights will need to be “translated.”  A basic human right to 
sustenance will take a rather different form for machines, for instance, since they are unlikely to 
                                                 
29
 Some claim that this argument could be used to extend rights to a foetus.  However, I think it clear that a foetus 
does not at the time it is a foetus act like me in a wide range of situations; we weigh the probability of its 
personhood as less than that of an adult human, although how much less will depend on the individual. 
30
 It is probably possible also to defend granting moral standing to such machines on a rationality-based 
understanding of the moral community, however as I am sympathetic to the criticisms of such theories, I shall not 
attempt to do so here. 
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need food and water; they might well have an similar need for access to electricity, however.  
Similarly, just as humans have a need for medical care of various kinds, intelligent machines 
might require certain kinds of preventative maintenance or repairs. 
Even such basic rights raise issues concerning what it means for these machines to exist or to 
cease to exist.  In order to have a right to self-preservation, we must understand what that means 
with respect to these beings.  At present, I can create a copy of a file which is functionally 
identical to the original.  If I copy it on to two separate computers, we generally say that the 
same file is on each computer.  What happens if this is possible to do with a virtual 
consciousness?  Does the entity survive so long as at least one copy remains?  If there are 
multiple copies, does that mean that there are now multiple copies of the same entity?  Or are 
each separate entities with separate identities?  Can we destroy an intelligent machine as long as 
we have copied all of its files onto another machine?  What is life and death to a machine?
31
 
Moving beyond basic needs for survival, consider rights on a larger socio-political scale, such 
as the basic human rights espoused in the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights (1948).   
It is not immediately obvious how some of these will be handled, such as the claim that everyone 
has the right to a nationality.  For humans, we determine that nationality based on the arbitrary 
criterion of birthplace (or parental nationality); it is then theoretically possible to change 
affiliation by undergoing certain processes.
32
  One might suggest, therefore, that we could grant 
machines a starting nationality based on where they were first “switched on.” 
 
4.2 Rights of Virtual Entities 
 
This answer is further complicated if we extend moral consideration from machines to entities 
which are not embodied and have only a virtual presence.
33
  My argument could fairly easily be 
expanded to include these entities, since they could also display autonomy or self-awareness.  
The main adjustment needed is to devise an understanding of what their existence consists in, 
since it cannot be linked easily to embodiment.  We do not have much experience with non-
corporeal existence, hence there are metaphysical questions that would need to be addressed 
before we can determine how best to understand the rights of these beings.  
For instance, the human sense of self is frequently tied to our physical embodiment; we see our 
bodies as part of who we are, which is why people who undergo procedures such as 
mastectomies often struggle to see themselves as the same person. (Piot-Ziegler et al. 2010)  This 
strong connection to our bodies makes it hard for us to comprehend what sort of identity a 
disembodied being would have.  Clearly such a being should be able to have an identity, 
however, since even after an amputation or a mastectomy a person retains some sense of self, 
even if somewhat altered.  As such, a specific embodied form is not a requirement for identity 
and self-awareness.  Similarly, the desires of many people not to be kept alive in persistent 
                                                 
31
 This touches on questions relevant to moral agency as well, since as people have noted (Asaro 2012), having legal 
responsibility would require us to be able to punish a machine which failed in its legal responsibilities; this requires 
us to know whether and how it is possible to do so.  
32
 I say “theoretically” since, in practice, the change of nationality is fairly difficult; most people are pragmatically 
limited to the nationality of their birth, regardless of having a human right to change it. 
33
 One could object that, speaking precisely, such entities will likely not be wholly virtual.  Rather, they may well 
require the existence of physical objects in the same way that computer viruses require physical machines on which 
to reside; their existence is not independent of physical objects.  However, the identity of the virus or the machine is 
quite distinct from the physical object(s) they depend on in a way unlike our experience of other identities; if they 
are embodied, it is in a very different sense than we currently understand. 
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vegetative states highlights the fact that for many the important component of identity is not the 
body.  Together, this implies that a virtual entity could have an identity.  Yet clearly this sort of 
entity will complicate questions such as nationality: how do you attach a nationality to something 
which does not have a physical presence per se?  Is there any benefit to trying to do so?  What 
would it mean if they existed outside the current borders of our political structures?  
One possible avenue for investigation is to consider how we treat the moral status of other 
non-biological entities, such as corporations; they too have an existence which is not directly tied 
to a particular physical instantiation.  A number of philosophers (Wallach and Allen 2009, Asaro 
2012) have noted that we have granted legal rights and responsibilities to corporations, 
effectively treating them like persons.  Furthermore, corporations can commit moral wrongs, 
such as outsourcing garment production to places which lack reasonable safety precautions for 
workers; corporations which do this are unethically placing profits ahead of human life.  These 
kinds of issues particularly occur with multi-national corporations; we are struggling with how to 
apply the notions of rights and responsibilities to entities which are not tied to a single location 
and physical entity.  While machines will differ from corporations in a variety of ways, the 
parallel highlights the fact that we have made this kind of extension of morality before; there 
may be no easy answers, but we are not left entirely without precedent.
34
 
 In addition to translating current human rights into forms which are more applicable to 
machines, it will likely be necessary to consider new problems which these machines generate.  
For instance, at the moment, it is not possible to replicate the contents of my mind.  As such, my 
identity is fairly solidly unique and not in need of protection.  However, as artificial brains 
become possible, we must ask whether a person has some kind of uniqueness rights; if we copy a 
virtual entity on to another machine without its permission, have we wronged it?
35
  These 
questions will be necessary to consider as we move forward with artificial intelligence.  Hence 
while it is clear that conscious, self-aware machines have moral standing, it is much more 
difficult to say exactly what that standing grants them; much depends on how our technologies 
evolve. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
I have argued that the sentience criterion for moral standing is, in fact, insufficient to cover all 
humans; it does not explain what is morally wrong about one’s action in the congenital analgesia 
case.  Rather than seeing sentience as necessary for moral standing, therefore, I have suggested a 
move to an interest-based account: if a being has interests, then it is wrong to ignore those 
interests or to harm them in the absence of some suitable overriding reason.  This view of moral 
patiency, however, may be extended to machines.  If a machine has interests, then it may be 
harmed or benefitted; it deserves some moral consideration. 
Furthermore, I have argued that there are several ways that a being may have interests in 
addition to being sentient.  A self-aware conscious being will have interests; so will an 
autonomous intelligent machine.  In general, if a being is capable of desiring its own continuance 
and of forming wishes about its future, then we have some prima facie obligation to respect those 
desires.
36
  Determining the details of machines’ moral standing is difficult, particularly since the 
                                                 
34
 There is, of course, debate about whether this is a good precedent to have set.  The point remains, however, that 
we have dealt with non-human persons in the law before; it is not entirely new territory. 
35
 This is similar to questions raised by cloning a person without permission. 
36
 As with any other member of the moral community, those rights may be overridden if necessary. 
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relevant machines do not yet exist (or at least are not acknowledged to exist); some moral 
theorizing may need to wait until we have a better idea of what they are like.  However, we have 
some precedent for thinking about the moral standing of non-biological entities by considering 
the moral status of corporations. 
The battle for recognition of machines’ moral standing will not be easy.  We do not 
acknowledge the claims of others readily, even when the only difference between ourselves and 
those people is skin colour or gender; this difficulty will be magnified for intelligent machines.  
One key problem is the need for others to acknowledge the autonomy and/or consciousness of 
those machines.  Philosophers have been arguing over the problem of other minds for millennia 
with respect to humans; the problem will likely magnify for machines, since we do not have a 
clear set of criteria that all will accept as sufficient for consciousness or autonomy.
37
  The risk of 
attributing incorrect moral standing to machines is one which will likely plague discussions of 
machine ethics for some time to come. 
Although I acknowledge that we make mistakes in our attribution, I believe that we are more 
likely to err on the side of conservatism than that of excess.  Not only do we have a long history 
of doing so to other humans, given our past experiences with colonialism, but there will likely be 
intense financial pressure not to recognize machines as moral persons.  We depend upon 
machines to do many tasks for us, and we do not currently pay machines or worry about their 
needs (beyond perhaps basic maintenance).  One of the rights enshrined by the United Nations 
(1948) is the right to remuneration for work, meaning that the financial pressure to avoid 
recognizing any moral standing for intelligent machines will likely rival the push to avoid 
acknowledging African-Americans as full persons in the Confederate South.  However, we 
cannot ethically deny someone moral standing simply because it is convenient.   
The time to start thinking about these issues is now, before we are quite at the position of 
having such beings to contend with.  If we do not face these questions as a society, we will likely 
perpetrate injustices on many who, in fact, deserve to be regarded as members of the moral 
community.  I urge moral generosity when considering the moral claims of machines; we need to 
counter our legacy of sluggishness in recognizing as moral persons those who are physically 
unlike us. 
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